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Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining?
A Test Using Dual Jobholders
Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas, Rafaele Saggio, and Stephen A. Woodbury
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n We propose a test to distinguish
between wage posting and wage
bargaining.
n Using dual jobholders in
Washington State, we estimate the
sensitivity of wages and separation
rates to wage shocks in a secondary
job, our measure of outside option.
n In lower parts of the wage
distribution, improved outside options
lead to higher separations rates but
not to higher wages, consistent with
wage posting.
n In the highest wage quartile,
improved outside options lead
to higher wages, but not higher
separation rates, consistent with
bargaining.

H
ow wages are set is a central question for research on unemployment, business
cycles, and wage inequality. Two main frameworks for wage setting are wage bargaining

and wage posting. Models of wage bargaining assume that workers have the ability to
negotiate compensation with their employer, and that wages incorporate information
about an individual worker’s outside option. Te alternative to bargaining is wage
posting, whereby an employer ofers a package of compensation that the worker must
take or leave. Under wage posting, wages only respond to outside options measured at
the market level—changes in an individual worker’s outside option have no infuence.
Hall and Krueger (2010, 2012) obtained direct evidence by surveying a representative
sample of newly hired workers in the United States and found that one-third reported
bargaining over pay before accepting their position. Hall and Krueger’s work stimulated
several studies using observational data: Faberman et al. (2017) found that workers who
could have stayed in their jobs before accepting another position reported obtaining a
higher wage, and Lachowska (2017) found that workers’ subjective assessments of how
easy it would be to fnd an alternative job or to be replaced in their current jobs are highly
correlated with the wage received in their current jobs. Tis early research suggests a
signifcant role for workers’ outside options and bargaining in determining wages.
In this brief, we summarize a diferent approach to understanding the relative
importance of wage bargaining and wage posting. Te approach is based on the
experience of dual jobholders observed in linked employer-employee wage records from
Washington State. We measure the change in a dual jobholder’s outside option at the
primary job as the change in the average wage of the worker’s coworkers in the secondary
job.1 By using this worker-specifc measure of the outside option, we can estimate how
primary-job wages react to wage changes in secondary jobs while controlling other
changes afecting all workers at the primary employer. Finding that primary-job wages
respond to wage changes in the secondary job suggests wage bargaining; absence of a
wage response suggests wage posting.
To more clearly distinguish wage posting from wage bargaining, we also examine
whether separations from the primary job are related to wage changes in the secondary
job. In a job where wages are posted and not negotiable, we expect workers to respond to
a better outside option by leaving the job for that option. In our setting, the job ofering
the better outside option is the dual jobholder’s secondary job.
Who Leaves and Who Bargains?

Figure 1 shows how the distribution of dual jobholding by industry in the sample
we analyze compares to the industry distribution of single jobholders. Dual jobholding
For additional details, see the full working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/359.

1
We describe our approach in greater detail in the accompanying W.E. Upjohn Institute working paper
(Lachowska et al. 2022). Our approach is related to work by Caldwell and Harmon (2019), who examine how
wages are afected by changes in the wages of former coworkers.
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Figure 1 Where Do Dual Jobholders Work?

Individual wage
bargaining occurs only
in the top one-fourth of
the wage distribution.
For other workers, wage
setting is characterized
by wage posting, or takeit-or-leave-it ofers by
employers.
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NOTE: The fgure shows the proportion of single jobholders (black bars), of the primary job of dual
jobholders (red bars), and of the secondary job of dual jobholders (blue bars), by industry. Observations
of single jobholders and of dual jobholders’ primary jobs in educational services and public
administration are omitted.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Washington State wage records.

is concentrated in service sectors—health care, accommodation and food services, and
retail trade—with these industries roughly equally represented among primary and
secondary jobs. Workers in manufacturing, information, and fnance and insurance are
less likely to be dual jobholders.
Using this sample of dual jobholders, the analysis points to two main fndings. First,
changes in a worker’s wage in the primary job are only weakly relative to changes in the
wages of coworkers in the secondary job. Overall, then, bargaining plays a quite limited
role in wage setting. Rather, when wages on the secondary job improve, workers tend
to leave the primary job for the secondary job. Specifcally, a 10 percent increase in the
outside option leads to a 4 percentage point increase in the probability of transitioning to
the job ofering the better outside option. Given the low baseline separation rates in our
sample, this estimate represents a large increase.
Second, we fnd substantial diferences in the prevalence of bargaining and posting
among diferent groups of workers. Specifcally, bargaining is more prevalent among
workers in the top 25 percent of the wage distribution. For these high-wage workers,
better outside options tend to result in higher wages on the primary job rather than
separation and movement to the secondary job. But for workers in the lowest 25 percent
of the wage distribution, we see no evidence of pay increases on the primary job from
improved outside options. Instead, we see separation from the primary job, consistent
with wage posting and an absence of bargaining.
Figure 2 elaborates on this point, showing that sectors of the economy where
improved outside options lead to wage increases tend to be those where improved
outside options lead to fewer separations. Specifcally, the horizontal axis shows the
estimated efect of a 1 percent improvement in the outside option on the primary-job
wages, while the vertical axis shows the estimated efect of a 1 percent improvement in
the outside option on the likelihood of separating from the primary job and moving
to the secondary job. As indicated by the dashed, best-ft line, there is an inverse
2
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Figure 2 How a 1 Percent Improvement in the Outside Option Afects Wages in
the Primary Job and the Likelihood of the Secondary Job Becoming
the Primary Job, by Industry
0.04

Effect on Secondary Job Becoming Primary Job

Consistent with previous
research, we fnd that
employers limit work
hours on primary jobs,
creating a motive to
moonlight for workers
who want additional
income.
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NOTE: This scatterplot shows the efect, by industry, of a 1 percent higher coworker average wage on the
secondary job on the log wage of the primary job among stayers (horizontal axis) and on the likelihood
of the secondary job becoming the primary job (vertical axis). The slope of the dashed, best-ft line is
negative, indicating that sectors in which primary job wages rise are less likely to result in separations.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Washington State wage records.

relationship: following an improvement in workers’ outside options, employers either
negotiate with them for better pay or the workers leave the employer for the job ofering
the better outside option. For example, in fnance and insurance, employers tend to
respond to improved outside options by negotiating a higher wage. In contrast, in health
care and accommodation and food services, improved outside options tend to lead to a
separation.
Efects of Changes in Hours on the Primary Job

Te data also allow us to study how wage changes in one job afect hours worked in
the other jobs. Tis feature helps us understand why workers choose to moonlight. Tere
are two results. First, we fnd that work hours with the primary jobs are insensitive to the
changes in the worker’s outside option. Tis is consistent with a simple model, outlined
in the working paper, where workaholics face limits on the hours they can work in their
primary jobs and take a second job for extra income. In other words, people moonlight
because they want extra income and their main jobs do not let them add hours.
Second, we fnd moderate, but signifcant, efects of wage changes in a worker’s
primary job and the hours worked on the secondary job. Because hours on the primary
job are essentially fxed, a change in the primary-job wage results in additional earnings
without a change in work efort—what economists call an income efect. We fnd that this
income efect is similar to those found in studies of individuals winning lotteries.
Conclusions

Our fndings show that wage posting is a common feature of the labor market, and
that separation is the main response to improved outside options, particularly for low3
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In the aggregate,
bargaining appears to be
a limited determinant of
wage setting.

wage workers. On the other hand, wage bargaining is not as prevalent in the data, except
perhaps when considering higher-wage workers.
Our approach to measuring the outside options of individual workers can be applied
to any setting with linked employer-employee data and multiple jobholders. However,
the results may not generalize to groups of dual jobholders working in nonstandard
work arrangements. Tese nonstandard arrangements include electronically mediated
“gig” jobs and other independent contractor positions that are not currently covered by
administrative wage records. Future research may answer whether these workers have
little power to negotiate wages or whether they bargain over wages.
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